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Download...
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a policy paper about national e-markets published by the UK’s Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)
Click here (655Kb)
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How are National Markets initiated?
Government has unique facilities to offer a comprehensive system of e-markets. These are granted to a consortium with the finance and expertise to build and run the desired system.
That chosen consortium must also take on specified obligations that ensure taxpayers don’t fund any part of the operation and that both data protection and market neutrality are aggressively enforced.
After proving the concept with pilots, step one is to accept that the potential of state-backed e-markets can only be released if they are recognised as a natural monopoly. Why is this so? Why couldn’t government bestow its favours on multiple competing marketplace systems?
| Government’s parcel of benefits (listed below) can’t be given out indiscriminately. That would encourage rogue operators who dump their responsibilities on the state.
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| In every market sector buyers want to be where there are most sellers. Sellers want to list where there are most buyers. Consolidation is inevitable. Why try to force fragmented markets in the digital age?
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| Leverage. Initiating one coherent system creates a huge commercial opportunity for operators. This enables the legislation to mandate expensive obligations while pushing transaction charges down. |
The "monopoly" being offered does not include any restrictions on other marketplaces. There will still be many types of online exchange, but only one system will have state backing. It adds to the choice available for buyers and sellers.
The tender process:
The legislation to initiate National Markets allows a winning consortium to run such a system for perhaps 15 years, retaining all the profits of their cut on transactions. In that time they alone will have a package of government granted facilities including:
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Benefits offered to the consortium by Government
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| Automated relationship with the courts
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Disputes between users are
referred into the courts by the system. Courts input judgements in ways the
system can enforce: eg downgrading a seller.
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| State bodies issue compatible PINs
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From driving licences to fire
certificates for premises to exam results. Any authorisation by the state
comes with a code the recipient can use to prove his status to National
Markets.
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| No-counterparty status
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National Markets are not
legally a party to any contracts they enable.
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| Pump priming
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All applicable public
spending goes through the new system unless better value is clearly
available elsewhere.
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| Taxation policy
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Without overly favouring the system,
fiscal policy will be altered to encourage workers currently in the black
economy into National Markets trading.
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| De-regulation
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Markets as diverse as Insurance,
Coach Travel and Land Use need new laws that will allow even the smallest
seller into the market for even the shortest length of time.
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| Banking status
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The system can hold (digital)
cash for its users and link directly to other bank accounts.
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| System fully independent of the state
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Tax authorities, welfare investigators
and so on can only access system data through an open court order. Users
need not fear surveillance.
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| Registration through post offices etc.
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There can be no facetious
identities in the system. Registration is based on sight of official
documents. That can happen immediately at any post office.
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Government should not be giving this out free, there are accompanying obligations on the winning consortium:
| Obligations imposed on the consortium
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| Public access kiosks
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Everyone in the country has
to have access to the new system from day one. In deprived areas where Internet
penetration is low the winning consortium has to fund a specified number of
public kiosks.
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| Interfacing with public bodies
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All the costs of connecting
the new system to the entire public sector are to be met by the consortium.
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| No manipulation of markets
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System programming must be
such that there can be no favoured sellers. It just creates the best match
based on the buyer’s stated needs.
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| No use of data
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There is no exploitation of
data about users for marketing or segmentation purposes. The system does
not analyse individual users.
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| Transparency of operation
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The system’s core code is
published openly, to be checked by anyone who believes it is not behaving as
it should. If published code does not match actual code, sanctions are
triggered.
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| Tax automation
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The system will
calculate the tax due on every individual transaction and deduct it at
source if the seller wishes.
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| Government can re-allocate in case of failure
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If there is
serious infraction of the above, or the system does not meet specified
performance levels, the whole operation can be re-tendered.
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| No-charge facilities
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In time the system
might run no-charge facilities (voting for instance). The extent of this needs to be made
clear to the bidding consortia.
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This package of unique benefits with accompanying obligations is put out to tender. Each consortium is asked to specify the one flat rate percentage mark-up they would need to put on transactions across all markets in the system for their 15 year concession if they were to operate the system. The qualified consortium committing to the lowest percentage mark-up wins the tender.
It’s worth doing the sums: fractions of 1% as the transaction charge could still create astonishingly profitable businesses over 15 years. Once the tender is awarded government gets out of the way and - within its mandate - the consortium are free to make purely commercial decisions while the clock is ticking on their period of concession.
Ensuring national control:
Even with all the controls embedded in the obligations a winning consortium, likely to be international, could quickly acquire a pivotal position in the national economy. This would be politically unacceptable.
The tender document needs to additionally insist on a split between the consortium who own the central servers powering the system and individual franchisees who run the actual front end marketplaces. One person will operate the market for car mechanics for instance, another drives the manufacturing facilities sector while an unrelated franchisee has every incentive to push the gardening services market. All franchisees are nationals who have agreed a split in the system’s flat rate mark up with the consortium.
The system grows through new franchisees coming forward either to launch new sectors or sub-divide existing ones as turnover expands. There is no controlling powerbase at the heart of the system. It’s a federal network with checks and balances.
Value added services.
Once functioning, National Markets will be a basic, regulated, utility. Anyone can repackage any part of the service, applying additional rules on top. A web-market for Catholic babysitters? A “personal services” exchange that masks real names during a transaction? A supermarket branded market for local shopping deliveries?
Anyone can set such services up on top of the National Markets service so all deals flow through the system, racking up users’ reliability records and ensuring all the protection unique to the main system. Each value added service has its own identity, adds whatever charges it chooses and compiles its own policy on user data. If any of these services go bust there’s minimal inconvenience, the user still has their relationship with the underlying system.
Why can't this get going without government ?
© Guaranteed Markets Ltd (UK) 2005. Some of the technology disclosed is
patent pending. "NEMs" and the chained faces logo are trademarks used with
permission. All rights reserved.
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History tells us...
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State backed monopolies are widely accepted, even when supplying the most vital services.
The idea of a public water supply was put forward by British civil servant Edwin Chadwick.
His outlandish concept was bitterly attacked by existing water supply companies who pointed out that one universal state-backed system would give its operators the ability to cut off everyone’s supply at will.
Chadwick’s scheme gained legal backing in the 1848 Public Health Act. The "unthinkable monopoly" granted over such a crucial supply? We’ve lived with it ever since.
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History tells us...
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Governments of all political hues continue to pass laws that create national infrastructure.
In the UK, Margaret Thatcher’s Channel Tunnel Act ensured the winning consortium have a monopoly until 2020 on fixed links to the continent.
In the US the Department of Commerce has over the years awarded online security providers VeriSign one monopoly on internet domain registrations and another on high level encryption for online fund transfers.
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